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LyriC Poetry As 
soCiety
Michael Clune
infidel Poetics: riddles, nightlife, 
Substance, by daniel tiffany. 
Chicago: university of Chicago 
Press, 2009. Pp. 254. $66.00 cloth, 
$24.00 paper.
Critics have recently renewed the 
assault on the lyric, this time in 
the name of restoring poetic texts 
to social contexts. in the most ac-
complished work to emerge from 
this latest assault—Virginia Jack-
son’s dickinson’s Misery—the poem 
is prized from its lyric isolation 
and read as a communication be-
tween members of a historical 
community.1 From its exile as the 
overheard speech of a vaguely ideo-
logical solitude, the poem is led out 
into a robust sociability. this kind 
of criticism is beyond plausible; it 
fairly glows with hearty good sense. 
Poems do not exist in vacuums; they 
exist in communities! And the idea 
of community on which critics such 
as Jackson rely is hardly eccentric. 
We all know what a community 
looks like before we ever read a lyric.
daniel tiffany’s infidel Poetics 
demolishes this common sense by 
showing us what a community looks 
like from the lyric’s perspective. For 
tiffany, this perspective is shaped 
by lyric’s basic feature: obscurity. 
Lyric obscurity is not obscure. the 
central paradox of the lyric is that 
obscurity is its most obvious feature, 
its “open secret.” obscurity is the 
first thing that the student exposed 
to lyric notices. this seems to sup-
ply a ready role for the professor. 
he or she is the person who will 
lead us from darkness to illumina-
tion; the professor will decipher the 
symbol and show us the human 
face, the trace of real relationship, 
hidden behind the curtain of a line. 
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the enigma of poetic language is of 
course precisely what the new com-
monsense critic seeks to dispel by 
placing the works in the historical 
loam of letters, conversations, news-
papers, advertisements, speeches, 
and preaching from which they 
arise. For tiffany, by contrast, ob-
scurity is the key to lyric’s distinctive 
modes of community. he asks us to 
linger with the obvious mystery of 
the poem, to remain, in the phrase 
from Milton that tiffany repeat-
edly quotes, before the “darkness 
visible” of lyric language.
two models of community 
emerge from this reading practice. 
the first is a collective mode consti-
tuted by “obscurity effects . . . gen-
erated by the poetic enigma” (9). in 
his exposition of this model, tiffany 
develops georg simmel’s and eve 
sedgwick’s theories in order to read 
examples of the lyric incorporation 
of subcultural speech from early 
english canting songs to contem-
porary rap. simmel’s sense that se-
cretive speech is a “communicative 
event” apart from its decodable con-
tent (4) and sedgwick’s analysis of 
the way the “spectacle” of the closet 
constitutes a source of social fasci-
nation (15) furnish tiffany with a 
flexible frame for showing how lyri-
cal patois or cant draws us in. the 
collectives maintained by such lyrics 
“remind us of the possibility of com-
munities that defy the seemingly 
inexorable logic of transparency 
and continuity implicit in the social 
imaginary of the internet” (11).
As a preliminary model of the 
communal being of the lyric reader, 
then, tiffany offers us the initi-
ate whose relation with another is 
routed through shared contact with 
a dense sociologically subterranean 
language. infidel Poetics would 
have been an important book had 
it done nothing more than to trace 
this figure’s surprising centrality 
across literary and vernacular po-
etries. But the book’s true urgency 
for contemporary criticism lies in 
tiffany’s exploration of the second 
mode of lyric collectivity, which he 
defines, somewhat forbiddingly, 
at the book’s outset as “A constel-
lation, or mass, of expressive rela-
tions between entities which are 
essentially solipsistic” (9).
As we shall soon follow tif-
fany’s criticism into the dark heart 
of philosophical counterintuition, 
it is worth stressing that his argu-
ment starts with, is founded on, 
and never loses contact with obvi-
ous features of poems recogniz-
able to any reader. he begins his 
delineation of the second model of 
community projected by the lyric 
with a description of riddles, classic 
exempla of poetic enigma. Viktor 
shklovksy’s comments on riddles 
provide an instructively contrasting 
preparation for tiffany’s approach. 
shklovsky, like tiffany, rejects the 
cryptographic method of reading 
riddles. When Boccaccio calls sex 
“scraping out the barrel,” the point 
is not to get the reader to substitute 
in the correct term but instead to 
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defamiliarize the image, to make 
one see it anew.2 in showing how 
the poem stimulates perceptual in-
tensity, shklovsky argues that the 
riddle’s indirection has a psycho-
logical payoff.3
tiffany, in search of ontological 
rather than psychological insight, 
focuses on a different, if equally 
common, feature: the tendency 
of the riddle, in impersonating an 
object such as a cross or a sword, 
to disown its speaking voice. he 
shows how riddles traditionally 
contain lines such as “Alefred or-
dered me to be made.” “Although 
these objects speak and thus appear 
to occupy, at a linguistic level, the 
position of a subject, their gram-
matical position in these statements 
is usually in the accusative case, 
‘godric made me,’ thereby preserv-
ing their status as objects that are 
acted upon” (35). the riddle fore-
grounds the curious nature of the 
lyric as an artifact that simultane-
ously manifests the expressive ca-
pacity of a subject’s speech and the 
stubborn muteness of a made thing.
readers of poetry will recognize 
the ubiquity of this simultaneity, 
which justifies tiffany in taking the 
formal problem of the riddle to be 
a formal problem for lyric as such. i 
think, for example, of sylvia Plath’s 
last poem, “edge.” “the woman is 
perfected. / her dead // Body wears 
a smile of accomplishment, . . . her 
bare // Feet seem to be saying: / We 
have come so far, it is over.”4 here 
the speech that properly belongs 
to the poem is attributed to dead 
feet through an as-if. this as-if, in 
which subjectivity is concealed in 
objecthood, is for tiffany the sub-
stance of lyric speech.
tiffany thus presents us with 
a concrete and characteristic fea-
ture of the riddle, abundantly il-
lustrated by examples from the 
sphinx through dickinson. the 
riddle is the ancient poetic form of 
enigmatic speech. this speech de-
clares at once the thing-like quality 
of subjectivity and the subjectivity 
lodged at the heart of the thing. 
And now tiffany asks: Why? Why 
should the riddle’s form compress 
and elide the difference between 
subject and object? Why should 
obscurity conceal this?
to answer this question, tiffany 
invokes the imbrication of subject 
and object in Leibniz’s metaphysics. 
Leibniz claims that the fundamental 
components of matter are monads. 
in one of the strangest turns in the 
history of philosophy, Leibniz de-
scribes these atoms of the objective 
world as “confused perceptions.” 
each monad “knows the infinite—
knows all—but confusedly. it is like 
walking by the seashore and hear-
ing the great noise of the sea: i hear 
the particular noises of each wave, of 
which the whole noise is composed, 
but without distinguishing them” 
(111). tiffany finds in Leibniz’s 
theory a compelling set of terms for 
preserving the fascinating obscurity 
of the riddle’s subject-object from 
criticism’s cryptographic impulses.
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if the form of the riddle pro-
vides one instance of an obscure 
mixture of subject and object, tif-
fany argues that the swirl of con-
fused perception also characterizes 
the lyric image. the examples that 
tiffany offers us range from Vir-
gil’s description “of an attempt to 
dislodge a beehive from a tree with 
a smoky torch” (49) to the “ember 
of [gerard Manley hopkins’s] pied 
beauty, too faint to illuminate any-
thing but itself, and therefore akin 
to darkness” (57).5 Capacious as tif-
fany’s archive is, readers will want 
to test his challenging formulations 
against their own favorite lyric ex-
amples. For myself, i found his ac-
count to be an accurate explanation 
of what one would have to accept 
to take Keats’s negative capability 
seriously. in Keats’s account of the 
generation of lines such as “the 
murmorous haunt of flies on sum-
mer eves,” he distinguishes between 
a poetry that aims at representation 
of the object’s form and a poetry 
that aims at replication of the ob-
ject’s substance in language.6 in the 
metaphysical frame that tiffany 
sets up, the dense, quasi- objective, 
confused perception embodied by 
lyric language is not different in 
kind from the substance of matter.
once again, we are brought up 
against the unsettling quality of po-
etry’s common sense. From Kant 
through heidegger, the attempt 
to be adequate to obvious facts of 
aesthetic phenomena has pushed 
philosophy to extremes. tiffany 
adopts Leibniz’s concept of matter 
as confused perception as a useful 
description both of the uncanny 
mixture of subject and object that 
he finds in the riddle and the lyric 
image and of the unusual relations 
that extend from these forms.
We are now in a position to 
assess these relations. Leibniz’s 
“metaphysics . . . can offer critical 
insights into the relational power 
of hermetic forms” (9). the ques-
tion of the kinds of relations proper 
to poetic speech has preoccupied 
aesthetics since the eighteenth cen-
tury. Looking back on this history 
from the mid-twentieth century, 
hans gadamer isolates two options. 
the first is allegory, in which the 
poet pairs one thing with another 
through an association mimetic of 
the arbitrary nature of the linguis-
tic sign. the second is symbol. Ac-
cording to gadamer, the way that 
the latter connects things is through 
neither social convention nor an 
equivalence arbitrarily chosen by 
the poet. rather, the symbol “pre-
supposes a metaphysical connec-
tion between visible and invisible.”7 
rimbaud’s “Voyelles,” for example, 
is allegory that tries to pass itself 
off as symbol. Mallarme’s livre and 
Virgil’s smoky torch are the genu-
ine articles. Lacking the clear asso-
ciations of allegory or convention, 
the correspondences that radiate 
from the symbol are indefinite.
the metaphysical turn of infi-
del Poetics develops this tradition of 
analyzing the lyric symbol. “Like 
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monads,” tiffany writes, poems 
“are forms—centers of reflection—
which mirror all other forms” (93). 
instead of the direct connection that 
the allegorical image forges with a 
single other, the withdrawal of lyric 
from clear limited connections is 
the prerequisite for the work of un-
limited mimesis. the very obscu-
rity of the symbol is the signal of its 
functioning, its confused mirror-
ing of the sum total of reality. the 
enigma of the lyric image conceals 
a multiplicity of relations.
this claim will appear exces-
sive only to readers who have not 
spent much time with the modern 
lyric. As tiffany notes, Adorno, 
perhaps the most rigorous analyst 
of the lyric’s social dimension, him-
self adapted the terms of Leibniz’s 
Monadology to describe lyric phe-
nomena. But it is crucial to mark 
tiffany’s difference from Adorno 
in this respect. For Adorno, the 
lyric withdraws from direct rela-
tions to a space apart, from which it 
reflects the social whole. the poem 
becomes, in the famous phrase 
from “Lyric Poetry and society,” “a 
philosophical sundial of history.”8 
Adorno is thus interested in lyric 
as an optic for learning about ac-
tual social relations. tiffany, on the 
other hand, is interested in poetry 
as an instance of and model for new 
relations.
tiffany’s solipsistic lyric monad 
does not communicate. rather, its 
entire being is flooded by a total 
relationality unlimited by norm, 
convention, or rule. his innova-
tion is to take up an aspect of Leib-
niz’s thought that Adorno neglects. 
Leibniz writes of a harmony that 
obtains between monads, a myste-
rious and internal alignment that 
exists without interaction. in tif-
fany’s hands, this harmony makes 
the lyric’s confused reflection of the 
whole look less like an opportu-
nity for knowledge and more like 
a place to live. the lyric offers us an 
example of a different kind of so-
cial being. Like Bersani’s “anticom-
munal model of connectedness,” 
which tiffany cites, tiffany’s lyric 
monadology is a powerful response 
to our age’s deep dissatisfaction 
with the bitter logic of recogni-
tion, with the degraded spectacle 
of social communication, with the 
unwholesome labor of insinuat-
ing oneself across the boundaries 
of the other (13). By withdrawing 
from interaction and communica-
tion, the obscure lyric finds itself 
at home with the whole world. 
tiffany thus enables us to see in 
dickinson’s select lyric society a ca-
paciousness exceeding the wildest 
claims of Whitman’s rhetoric.
i want to close by suggesting that 
the choice between Adorno and 
tiffany is a good way of posing the 
options faced by contemporary so-
cial poetics. it is a choice between a 
poetics oriented to the generation 
of knowledge about actual societies 
and a poetics oriented to the explora-
tion of the virtual societies generated 
by lyric. At first glance, Adorno’s 
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path will probably strike most read-
ers as more plausible, less outland-
ish. But this perception is superficial. 
tiffany wants to do no more than 
to explain obvious features of lyric, 
and he adopts Leibniz’s metaphysics 
as a tool useful for this task. tiffany 
makes no claim that Leibniz is right 
about the structure of reality, only 
that Leibniz’s theory turns out to be 
a good way of explaining certain key 
features of lyric.
Adorno’s relentless translation 
of lyric into social optic, on the other 
hand, conceals a hegelian social 
metaphysics, one that he assumes to 
be an accurate description of reality 
without presenting any evidence.9 
Perhaps the accumulation of a half 
century of readings by his progeny 
provide all the evidence we need. 
how do things stand? does anyone 
today think Adorno-style social po-
etics have meaningfully increased 
our knowledge of actual societies? 
What could be more outlandish 
than that?
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Notes
 1. Virginia Jackson, dickinson’s Misery 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton university 
Press, 2005). Jackson wants to re-
place the “alienated lyric image of the 
human” with “the exchange between 
historical persons between whom the 
barriers of space and time had not 
fallen” (117).
 2. Viktor shklovsky, “Art as technique” 
(1917), in russian Formalist critics, 
edited by Lee t. Lemon and Marion J. 
reis, (Lincoln: university of Nebraska 
Press, 1965), 21.
 3. in his treatment of Burke’s analysis of 
the obscurity proper to the sublime, 
tiffany similarly de-emphasizes the 
psychological reading of Burke. For a 
recent example of the latter, see Alan 
richardson, The neural Sublime (Balti-
more: Johns hopkins university Press, 
2010).
 4. sylvia Plath, The collected Poems of 
Sylvia Plath (New york: harper, 1992), 
272, emphasis added.
 5. While the Aeneid is of course an epic, 
tiffany relies on r. W. Johnson’s clas-
sic study of Virgil’s influence on the 
european lyric tradition in arguing that 
this image becomes foundational for 
post-renaissance lyric.
 6. John Keats, Keats’ Poetry and Prose, 
edited by Jeffrey N. Cox (New york: 
Norton, 2009), 458.
 7. hans-georg gadamer, Truth and 
Method, translated and revised by Joel 
Weinsheimer and donald g. Marshall 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 60.
 8. theodor Adorno, “Lyric Poetry and 
society,” in The Adorno reader, edited 
by Brian o’Connor (oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), 221.
 9. Perhaps in response to a felt weaken-
ing of the persuasiveness of Adorno’s 
hegelianism, robert Kaufman, in a 
brilliant series of essays, has recently 
attempted to give us a Kantian Adorno. 
For Kaufman’s Adorno, the lyric pro-
vides the critic with an opportunity to 
generate new social scientific concepts 
out of the encounter with the poem’s 
quasi-conceptual form. this has the po-
tential to rescue Adorno from the great 
weakness of social criticism: knowing 
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in advance what the work will tell you 
about society. see “red Kant,” criti-
cal inquiry 26, no. 4 (summer 2000): 
682–724; and “Adorno’s social Lyric 
and Literary Criticism today,” in The 
cambridge companion to Adorno, edited 
by tom huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2004). Adorno’s think-
ing on the transformational capacity of 
the work of art, especially in Aesthetic 
Theory (Minneapolis: university of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), offers another 
promising alternative to his influential 
view of art’s critical power.
